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Summary findings
Bolivia's bold program of pension reform involved the  Proceeds from the "capitalization" program will be
immediate closing down of the old pay-as-you-go system  used to pay an annuity to all Bolivians 65 and older.
and its replacement by a defined-contribution  system  Funds from the capitalization program will also be
based on individual capitalization accounts and managed  managed by the two selected AFPs. Custodianship has
by the private sector.  been entrusted to a multinational group offering global
The pensions of the old system will be covered by the  custodial services.
Bolivian Treasury. Workers will receive compensatory  AFP investments are only subject to upper limits,
pensions for their contributions  to the old system. These  including relatively high limits for foreign assets.
will be calculated on the basis of a simple formula that  However, they must initially purchase a certain quantity
could be improved to reduce the cost of transition.  of treasury bonds to help finance the cost of transition.
To avoid high marketing costs, Bolivia has entrusted  Bolivian pension reform faces major challenges:
management of the system to two groups selected  *  To create a competitive market for management of
through international competitive bidding (to minimize  pension fund resources and hence achieve competitive
fees). Individual accounts have been preallocated to those  returns on investment and higher pensions.
two groups on a regional basis or, in large cities, on the  *  To eliminate the requirement  of investment in
basis of the birthdays of affiliated workers. Competition  treasury bonds.
for individual accounts will be allowed in the year 2000  *  To insulate the system from attempts to use AFP
and the market will be opened to other private pension-  funds and capitalization proceeds for public projects.
fund administrators (AFPs)  in 2002.  (One way to achieve this would be to transfer ownierslhip
of the capitalization proceeds to individual Bolivians.)
This paper-a  product of the Private Sector Development Cluster, Finance, Private Sector, and Infrastructure Department
- draws on work done for the Bolivia Financial Markets and Pension Reform Project. Copies of this paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H  Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Cecilia Pavlak, room 15-030,
telephone 202-458-2099,  fax 202-334-0113,  Internet address cpavlak@worldbank.org. September 1997. (26 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is  to get the  findings  out quickly,  even if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are entirely  those  of the  authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the 'World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
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'This paper draws on work done  for the Financial  Markets  and Pension  Reform  Project  (World  Bank
1995). I benefited  from discussions  with  rnany  colleagues  at the World  Bank as well as with Bolivian
officials.A.  BACKGROUND
On November 29, 1996 the Bolivian Government adopted a pension reform law
(Law  1732) that  modified fundamentally the  country's  pension  system. The  Bolivian
reform  changed  the  defined-benefit publicly-managed pension  system  into  a  defined-
2 contribution privately-managed system with individual capitalization accounts.  The new
system, currently under  implementation, has many common features with  the  reforms
undertaken  in  other  Latin  American  countries  but  has  some  important  differences,
particularly during the transition phase from one system to another.
This  paper  describes the  old  and  the  new  pension  systems,  summarizes  the
particular features of the new system that differentiate it from other reforms, and presents
some of the outstanding challenges  to successfully complete the reform. 3 Macroeconomic
and financial sector effects of the reform are two important issues for further analysis that
are not covered in this paper.
B.  THE OLD PENSION SYSTEM
Institutional framework. 4 The old Bolivian pension system was a defined-benefit
system created in 1997 and aiming originally at a replacement rate of about 30% of the
last wage.  To increase the replacement rate unions and professional groups obtained in
1970 changes in the regulations that allowed for complementary pension funds.  In 1996,
the  system  consisted  of  a  basic  pension  system,  administered  by  a  public  agency
2  Under  the old system,  retirement  benefits  were one  component  of the social  security  system,  which
provided  also survivorship  and disability  pensions,  and medical  insurance.  The new system  includes
also survivorship  and disability  pensions,  but leaves  medical  benefits  untouched.
3  The paper is part of a series  of papers  by the Financial  Sector  Development  Department  of the World
Bank on private  pension  funds in Latin American  pension  reforms. See  Queisser  (1997),  Vittas
(1997a, 1997b,  1997c),  and Vittas and Iglesias  (1992).
4  This segment  draws  on World  Bank (1995)  and Ballivian  (1997).
1(FOPEBA),  and 38 complementary funds, including the  eight social  security funds of
public universities and one for the armed forces. Most of the complementary fund affiliates
were  public sector employees. Participation  in the basic fund  was compulsory for  all
formal sector workers. Participation in complementary funds was voluntary in principle,
but  in  practice  virtually all  workers  affiliated to  FOPEBA  were  also  affiliated to  a
complementary fund.
Contributions  and  benefits.  Contributions  to  FOPEBA  had  three  sources:
employees contributed 2.5%  of their salaries every month, employers contributed 4.5%
and  the  Government was  expected to  contribute  1.5%  (in  practice  it  only  paid  its
contributions  for  public  sector  employees).  The  complementary pension  funds  had
different  contribution rates, but  all the  contributions were  made by  employees. Rates
averaged  an  additional 6.3% of  salaries with  a  spread between 3.5%  and  12%.  The
retirement age under the old system was 50 years for women and 55 years for men. To
qualify for retirement workers had to have a minimum of 180 contributions, equivalent to
15 years  of  work.  The monthly benefit under  the  FOPEBA  consisted  of  a  pension
equivalent to 30% of the average monthly salary during the last five years of contributions.
Benefits under the complementary pension funds replaced on average an additional 40%
of  salaries. Benefits were  paid in Bolivianos (Bs) and  adjusted yearly by 90%  of  the
average general wage increase decreed by the Government. Only the benefits accrued
under FOPEBA were explicitly guaranteed by the Government, although the discretionary
interventions to bail out complementary funds in trouble created an implicit guarantee for
them.
Coverage. The coverage of the system was very small. As of end- 1996 FOPEBA
had approximately 300,000 active affiliates and most of them were  also members of a
complementary fund.  Of the 300,000 affiliates, about 65% were public sector employees 5
and the remainder were employees mostly of the formal private sector in urban areas. The
number of retirees was roughly 120,000. Therefore, the system's dependency ratio was
5  The largest group  is that of teachers  with about  86,000 affiliates.
240% against a demographic old age dependency ratio of 6%6.  The covered wage bill as a
percentage of GDP was about 12%.
Bolivia's economy has a large informal sector where about 60% of the labor force
is employed but the small coverage of the defined benefit pension system was also the
result of widespread evasion.  Affiliates as a share of the total (urban) economically active
population  in  1996 were  roughly  12%  (22%)7.  Other  indicators  of  evasion are  the
composition of the affiliates as only 40% are workers  and the rest  are technicians and
professionals, while only 15% of the enterprises registered with the internal revenue office
were affiliated to the pension system.
There  were  few incentives to  join  the  pension  system.  Previous  inflationary
periods had  eroded the value of pensions and there was  no enforcement of  affiliation
norms. Contributions to the pension system were widely perceived by both employers and
employees  as  an  additional tax  on labor.  Although the  old  system had  also  strong
incentives to  underreport  wages  to  lower  contribution payments, among  other  things
because the pension was based on the salary of the last 12-60 months, underreporting does
not  seem to  have been widespread.  The system's income from contributions was about
12% of the  covered wage bill during the last years of the system and in line with  the
expected collection.  Most likely the large share of public sector contributors kept the
underreporting problem small.
Financial  situation.  The  old  pension  system  was  financially  unsustainable.
Regular transfers from the Treasury to FOPEBA (amounting to more then  1% of GDP
between  1993 and  1996) and occasionally to  some complementary funds had become
necessary and the accumulated deficit of FOPEBA was calculated to reach $400 million  by
2002, when it would have amounted to  nearly 5% of GDP.  The complementary funds
6 This  number  results  from  using  65  as the  cutoff  age. Using  60 as the  cutoff  age,  the  ratio  becomes  10%.
'  The  rural  and urban  populations  are  about  equal.
3were  in  different situations.  A few  of them  were  solvent but  most  were  financially
bankrupt.
In present value terms the  deficit of FOPEBA and the complementary fund for
public employees was estimated at more than $3,000 million (or  40%  of GDP).  This
situation was caused by several factors:
i.  the relation of  active to  passive affiliates was less than  3 to  1 on  average,  while
solvency required an equilibrium ratio closer to the demographic old age dependency
ratio of about 10 to  1. This ratio was worsening as the demographic tendencies in the
country implied an increasing proportion of retirement-age people relative to  active
contributors;
ii.  the hyperinflation in the mid-eighties, combined with deficient management, seriously
eroded the pension funds'  reserves (resources left after pension contributions were
used for health expenditures);
iii. the administrative costs of the funds were  very high.  At  17% of  contributions on
average these were not much higher then the 16% that Latin America used to have on
average but this level of costs triggered reforms in other countries; and
iv.  the private sector had a large debt to  the system, arising from non-payment of the
contributions  of  employers,  and  even  a  failure to  register  a  large  share  of  the
contributions of workers.
During  the  life  of  the  old  pension  system  several  attempts  at  reform  were
undertaken,  mostly to  improve monitoring and supervision, collection of contributions,
and use of funds. In  1985, health insurance was separated into a system of its own to
avoid the common practice of using pension contributions for health care expenditures.
But  the  actuarial  studies envisaged  in the  original pension  law  of  1957 were  never
undertaken.  These would have shown the need either to  adjust the retirement  age to
available resources and the increasing life expectancy or to increase the contribution rates
to maintain financial  balance.
4Old Pension System 8: Revenues and Expenditures
Year  Benefits  Contributions  Deficit
Bsmn.1991  %ofGDP  Bs.mn.1991  %ofGDP  Bs.mn.1991  %ofGDP
1993  477  2.35  446  2.20  31  0.15
1994  531  2.50  484  2.28  47  0.22
1995  621  2.49  503  2.26  118  0.23
Without changes to the system's framework that addressed the incentives of the
stakeholders the reforms  were doomed to fail.  In particular, participants in the scheme
had no  sense of ownership of the resources  being handled.  This led to  low levels of
accountability in  the  management  of these  resources  and  in  some  cases  to  outright
corruption as is being discovered now that the complementary funds are being liquidated.
C.  THE NEW PENSION  SYSTEM
The previous unsuccessful reform experiences and the unsustainability of the old
pension system led already the previous Government of 1989-1993 to  design a pension
reform that would radically change the system.  The current Government completed the
design of the new pension system when it passed Law 1732 in November 1996. The Law
closed the old pension system and established a new one based on individual capitalization
accounts.  It  also established a social program ("Bonosol") designed to  provide old-age
relief and financed by the shares of capitalized enterprises9.
8 Includes  both  FOPEBA  and complementary  funds (including  university  funds).
9 The "capitalization"  program has involved  the transfer  of 50% of the capital and managerial  control  of
a public  company  to a private  partner,  often  a foreign  investor,  in exchange  for an amount  of
investment  in the company  determined  through  bidding  for that control.  The program has been
applied  to the six largest public  enterprises  in Bolivia.  The remaining  50% shares  in the privatized
and recapitalized  companies  are held  in trust until their transfer  to the privately  managed  pension
5Individual Capitalization System
Contributions.  Contributions  are  withheld  by  employers  and  deposited  into
individual  accounts  managed  by  private  pension  fund  administrators  (AFPs).  The
withholding rate  on  salaries is  12.5%.  This includes  10%  to  be  deposited  in  each
individual account for long-term capitalization, 2% for  an insurance premium covering
physical impairment or death from common causes, and 0.5% for the AFPs' services 10. In
addition, employers will pay 2% of salaries for insurance covering physical impairment or
death from work-related causes".
Benefits.  There is no fixed retirement age. Individual workers are free to  retire
before reaching 65 if they have accumulated savings that are adequate to replace at least
70% of their average salary of the last five years for the remainder of their actuarially
calculated life expectancy. Retirement is possible at age 65 regardless of the amount of
savings accumulated.
There is no Government guarantee of a minimum  pension.  All participants over 65
receive the  Bonosol  annuity of  US$248  per  year plus  at  least  70%  of the  minimum
monthly wage of US$481 2 until their savings are exhausted.  Afterwards they receive just
the Bonosol annuity.  Therefore, while pensioners draw on their savings they can expect
funds  (AFPs).  They  are  earmarked  to finance  the  "Bonosol"  program  (see  below).  For  a brief
discussion  of the  "privatization  by  capitalization"  prograrn,  see  Ewing  and  Goldmark  (1994).
'°  Additional  deductions  from  monthly  salaries  are  a 13%  tax after  excluding  2 minimum  wages
(US$95),  10%  contribution  for health  insurance,  and  a 3%  contribution  for  a housing  fund.
l l Both  insurance  premiums  will  be adjusted  according  to case  history.  Experience  in other  Latin-
American  countries  leads  to the expectation  of lower  premiums  in the  future.
12 The  minimum  wage  is adjusted  periodically  but is currently  about  25%  of the  average  monthly  wage  of
about  US$190  per month.  The  average  wage  of  workers  affiliated  to the  old  pension  system  is about
US$250.
6total income above the minimum  wage. All pensions, those paid under the old system and
those arising from the new system, are indexed to the US dollar.
In addition there are death, survivorship and disability pensions financed by the
insurance contract. An important feature is that disability pensions for common risks are
only paid for total disability; there are no partial disability pensions.  These pensions are
equivalent to 70% of the reference salary and they also include continued payment of the
contribution  into  the  individual's retirement  account,  so  that  disability pensions  are
replaced by old  age pensions at age 65.  Disability from  work-related  causes includes
partial and total disability pensions, also with continued payment of the contribution into
the individual's retirement account so that this pension is also replaced by old age pension
at age 65.
Affiliation. All current contributors to the old pension system were automatically
transferred to the individual capitalization system on May 1, 1997, and the AFPs started
collecting their contributions" 3. All enterprises, as contribution-withholding agents, have
to  formally affiliate all their workers to  an AFP within two  years.  Included are those
individuals that fulfill requirements to retire under the old system as of April 30, 1997, but
continue working. This implies that, at the initial date, the new system will have around
300,000  affiliates.' 4 All new entrants to  the working  force must  affiliate to  the  new
system. In addition, all currently employed persons that should have been affiliated to the
old pension system, but were not, are required by law to be affiliated to the new system.
It  is  estimated,  that  there  are  about  500,000  unaffiliated workers  in  about  10,000
enterprises. Finally, independent workers who earn at least the minimum salary can also
affiliate to  the new system, on a voluntary basis.  As of June 16, 1997, 84,897 private
13 Unexpectedly,  contributions  to the old system  increased  from Bs. 26 million  in November  1996,  when
the Pension  Law was  passed,  to Bs. 43 million  in April 1997. Most likely  the effect  of contributing  to
a system  about to be closed  was dominated  by the increased  scrutiny.
14  Approximately  20,000  current  affiliates  to the old system  are expected  to fulfill  the requirements  for
retirement  by April 30, 1997,  and will retire under the old pension  system  rules at the expense  of the
Treasury.
7sector workers, equivalent to 77% of current participants, and all public sector workers
with the exception of the military' 5 had been affiliated  to an AFP.
Management.  Because of the small size of the country and to  avoid the high
marketing costs experienced in other Latin American countries, the authorities decided to
authorize only 2  management companies.  Thus, for  the first five years the  individual
capitalization accounts  will be  managed by  two  private  pension  fund  administrators
(AFPs), which  were  selected through  an  international bidding process  for the  lowest
service fee.  Initially these AFPs will share the market  in the  four major cities  of the
country  (La  Paz,  Cochabamba,  Santa  Cruz  and  El  Alto)  that  have  35%  of  the
population16,  and will be regional monopolies in their area of exclusivity'7. Sharing of the
market in the major cities among the AFPs will be according to the worker's birthday' 8.
Competition in these markets will start on January  1, 2000, when workers can switch
between AFPs and new workers are allowed to choose between the AFPs.  In May 2002
the market will be open to new management companies when competition will also reach
the exclusivity  areas and expand in the major cities.
Like in the Chilean pension system, the individual accounts of the affiliates own
units in a joint portfolio, much the same as in a mutual fund.  AFPs have to invest the joint
portfolio in accordance with maximum limits set by the regulations and enforced by the
Superintendency of Pensions.  However, they are also required to  buy for  15 years,  in
proportionate shares, up to $180 million per year of the Treasury bonds that will be issued
to  finance the  transition  from  the  old  to  the  new  system.  To  allow for  sufficient
15 This  will  require  a procedure  that  safeguards  confidentiality.
16 These  cities  have  78%  of  the  population  in the 10  cities  with  more  than  50,000  inhabitants  and 60%  of
the  urban  population.
17 For  the  purpose  of determining  the  area  of  exclusivity,  the  country  was  divided  in a northern  and
southern  region,  separated  by a dividing  line  running  East-West,  and excluding  the  four  major  cities.
The  AFP  with  the  best  bid was  given  first  choice  and selected  the  northern  area  of exclusivity.
18  Workers  born  on an uneven  day  to one  AFP  and  those  on an even  day  as  well  as January  1,3,  and 5 to
the  other  AFP.
8diversification, the  pension law specifies that  the maximum limit on  foreign securities
holdings, to be determined by the Board of the Central Bank, will be no less than  10%19
and no more than 50% and only instruments traded in the New York Stock Exchange and
the London Stock Exchange qualify.
Compensatory Pensions. Those affiliates who have contributed to the old pension
system will receive a  compensation for the  rights they acquired from  the  State.  This
compensation will be paid monthly upon retirement.  For those that have more than 60
contributions  (equivalent to  five years  of  work),  the  monthly  compensation will  be
calculated by the formula:
Years * 0.7
Compensation  --------------  x  last monthly salary
25
where "Years" is the number of years, or fraction thereof, contributed to the old system.
For example, for someone who has contributed for 25 years, the above formula implies
that, upon retirement, the State will replace 70% of the monthly salary of October 1996
for those employed at the time or the last monthly salary before this date for those that
were unemployed at the time. Both the reference salary and the compensatory pension are
subject to  a ceiling of 20 times the minimum wage. This amount will be indexed in US
dollar; thus, there will be an implicit tax on the compensation that is equivalent to the US
inflation between October 1996 and the time of retirement.  For those who have less than
60 contributions, the compensation will be  a lump-sum equal to  100 times the  amount
given by the above formula up to a payment of 20 times the minimum  wage.
'9 The  10%  limit  is the  lowest  level  that  the  Central  Bank  can  set for  the  maximum  percentage  the  AFP
can  invest  in foreign  securities.  The  AFP  can  choose  to invest  nothing  in foreign  securities  or any
amount  up to the  maximum  limit. At the  time  of writing  this  paper,  the  investment  regulations  have
not  been  issued  by  the Central  Bank The  issue  is not immediately  relevant  since  the AFPs  are
initially  required  to invest  a sizable  part  of their  funds  in treasury  bonds.
9Current retirees. Those people who have already retired under the old system will
continue to  receive their pensions as per that  system. In addition, those who qualify for
retirement under the old system's rules by May 1, 1997, can retire with the benefits of the
old system or  choose to  continue working and increase their salary replacement rate  -
calculated as per the old  system- by 2% for every year they remain in the work  force
beyond their eligibility. Alternatively  they can buy an additional annuity with the proceeds
of their individual account.  The contribution rate for this group of people is 12.5% of
salaries and is also collected by the AFPs.  When a worker retires under the old system,
the  AFP  concerned  transfers  the  balance  in  the  individual account  to  the  National
Treasury. Benefits to current retirees and eligible retirees will be financed by the National
Treasury.  Currently a transitory agency is calculating and paying the pensions under the
old system.  However, the system is designed in such a way that the payments of these
pensions will be made by the private sector.
The "Bonosol" Program
The Government decided that  it would use the proceeds of the "capitalization"
program for an untargeted old age relief bond instead of public projects.  Government
arguments for this untargeted program were the absence of a social safety net in old age,
the large impact that this program would have on the large number of very poor people,
the capitalized enterprises had been "paid" by the beneficiary population, and the dismal
track record of public sector projects.
Bonosol  is  an  annuity, intended to  distribute the  benefits of the  capitalization
program to all resident Bolivian citizens who were 21 years or older as of end-1995, once
they reach age 65 (about 3.5 million  people).  Currently there are no plans for a similar old
age  benefit for  the  next generations.  One  of  the  arguments  to  exclude  the  younger
population and the next generations from the BONOSOL is that the capitalized enterprises
had  been "paid" by the  beneficiary population and they are just  being "repaid".  The
10creation of a minimum  pension  scheme  for the next generations  will not become  necessary
for at least 40 years.
The benefit is financed  by the principal  and investment  income on the portfolio
consisting  of 50% of the shares of the capitalized  enterprises. This is currently  valued at
about $1,650  million 20 equivalent  to 22% of GDP, less  a provision  for death benefits  to be
financed  also with these funds. The annuity  will amount  to $248 per person per year for
the first five years and will then be revised  every  three years according  to changes  in the
portfolio  and life expectancy 21. There are currently  302,555  potential  beneficiaries.  As of
June 20,  1997, 191,245 persons, equivalent  to  63% of the potential beneficiaries  and
about 83% of the about  230,000 beneficiaries  that have  been issued  an ID, have  been paid
their annuity for 1997 by the AFPs.  This performance  is remarkable  because to avoid
fraud the Bonosol  has to be collected  in person. For those unable  to get to the payment
sites the AFPs are sending  representatives  to hospitals,  jails, and homes. Only 14 fraud
attempts have been detected so far in the distribution  of about US$48 million.  It is
expected  that during 1997 about 80% of those eligible  will receive  this benefit,  as not all
citizens  have the identity  card or registration  document  needed  for collecting  the benefit.
The remainder  will be able  to collect  the 1997  Bonosol  at a later date.
The two AFPs that manage  the individual  capitalization  accounts  will also manage
the "Bonosol" portfolio and distribute  its benefits.  To this end, the capitalization  shares
will be distributed  between  the two AFPs in proportion  to the number  of affiliates  in each
every  time that the Bonosol annuity  is recalculated.  Initially  each AFP manages  half of the
assets or about US$800  million 22. An important  feature in the management  of these assets
is that all liquid assets arising  either  from dividends  or the sale of shares  that are not used
20 This  valuation  arises  from  the  investment  commitments  made  by  the  investors  in the  capitalized  shares.
The  market  value  of  these  shares  will  of  course  fluctuate  and  will  most  likely  be  different.
21  On  the  issue  of  the  benefit  of  the  Bonosol  and  its  possible  regressive  impact, see  Ballivian  (1997).
22 Not  US$825  million  per  AFP  because  right  at  the  beginning  some  of  the  assets  were  used  to pay  the
first  Bonosol  annuity.
11to pay the Bonosol have  to be invested  in units of the joint portfolio  of individual  accounts
and in  this way are  subject to  the  same investment limits and regulations as  the
contributions  to the new pension  scheme. Therefore,  after the first inflow of cash, this
portfolio will consist of the  capitalized shares and units of  the joint  portfolio and
eventually  will only own  units and be fully  diversified  and facilitate  the supervision  efforts
of the regulator.
Regulatory Framework for the New System
Law 1732  includes  also  provisions  for a new institutional  regulatory  framework  for
the  entire financial sector. These provisions foresee the  establishment  of  a  General
Superintendency  for the Financial  Sector (SIREFI) and four sector superintendencies:
Banking, Pension System, Insurance, and  Capital Markets. The superintendents of
SIREFI,  of pensions  and of the capital  markets  were appointed  in mid-March  1997, while
the other two had already been appointed. Supreme  Decree 24469, issued January 22,
1997, provides  further  details  of the legal regulatory  framework.
D.  UNIQUE FEATURES
Link with Capitalization of Enterprises
An outstanding feature of the pension reform is its link to  the privatization and
recapitalization of  the  largest  public sector  enterprises.  Law  1544  on  capitalization
(March  21,  1994)  established that  the  resources  and  shares that  resulted  from  the
capitalization program would  be  managed by private  pension fund  managers selected
through an international  bidding process.  Therefore, in the normal management process of
these assets, the ownership of the shares will over time be well distributed over  many
private investors.  An important effect of this early definition was that potential investors
in the capitalization program received an early assurance that they would not be partners
12in a joint venture with the Government.  It is widely thought that this resulted in higher
bids for the privatized entities.
The  capitalized shares were  constituted into  a  fund (Fondo  de  Captitalizaci6n
Colectivo or FCC) to be managed by the AFPs.  The collective owners of the FCC are all
eligible Bolivians that will benefit through the Bonosol.  At some moment the plan was to
have individual accounts in the FCC, like in the contributory pension scheme, to establish
a  more direct  ownership 23 of the assets by the citizens.  This  alternative was rejected
because it was administratively  more complicated and would have taken longer.
Through the Bonosol program, Bolivia set up a universal old age income support
equivalent to  about 27% of Bolivia's per capita income. At a replacement rate  of only
11% of average earnings, the Bonosol's  objective  is to  provide subsistence support for
the poor.  When only the average labor income of the poor is considered, the Bonosol
replaces 85% of the income of the extreme poor and 50% of the income of the poor.  The
system is not financed by taxes on labor and thus, does not  distort investment decisions
against the use of labor.  Establishing the Bonosol also allowed for a pension system that
does  not  have guarantees  of  minimum pension or  minimum return  guarantees  on  the
portfolio, thus leaving Bolivia's Governrnent with very few contingent liabilities compared
to other countries that have reformed their pensions systems and of course compared with
countries that have not yet reformed them.
While setting up the Bonosol in the way it was done had several advantages for the
new pension system it could also be a source of instability if future Governments decide
that  they  could put  the  assets in the  FCC to  "better"  use  than paying the  Bonosol.
Diversion  of the  assets of  the  capitalization program,  in  addition  to  amounting  to  a
substantial breach in the rules for provision of old age income, would require significant
23 Direct  distribution  of  the shares  to Bolivians  was  considered  but rejected  as having  too many
drawbacks.
13reforms to the new pension system, would reduce the coverage of the system, and would
threaten the commercial viability of the system and of the AFPs.  The solution to this issue
is to develop a stronger sense of ownership over the FCC's  assets by the eligible Bolivians
to increase the political cost of the diversion of the assets.
AFP Selection Process
The link with the capitalization program also meant that the Government through
the Ministry of Capitalization 24 had to  find managers for the resources arising from the
capitalization program.  These resources were held by an international trustee until their
transfer to the selected AFPs.  The decision to allow for a bidding process to choose the
pension fund managers also forced an early decision on the number of participants in the
market.  After a long and intense debate the decision was to have initially only two AFPs
because of the current size of the market, to ensure the commercial viability of the AFPs,
and to attract highly reputable pension fund managers.
The selection of the AFPs to  manage the assets was a  two  stage process  that
started in July 1996, with the request for expressions of interest  published in the Wall
Street Journal, Financial Times, and in Pensions & Investments.  From the beginning the
process  received technical  assistance from  an  international strategic  adviser  and  an
international legal adviser. Large efforts were made to keep the process as transparent as
possible and to provide equal access to the information.  The objectives for the bidding
process were to  attract the maximum number of reputable and experienced pension fund
mangers, to create a competitive process, and to select the best possible AFPs.  Following
a strong promotional effort 25,  73 enterprises bought the Terms of Reference (TORs) in
August 1996.
24  This  Ministry  is a temporary  ministry  that  was  set  up to exclusively  carry  out  the capitalization  of
enterprises  and the pension  reformn.  Now  that both  processes  are well advanced  this ministry  will be
closed  as of June 30, 1997.
25  Including seminars,  road shows,  personal  presentations,  and an Internet  home page.
14The TORs specified the minimum  criteria to be satisfied by the asset managers and
that 8 of the qualified managers would be selected. The main criteria to qualify were:
i.  Experience in asset management, with at least $10 billion in assets under management,
and at least 20 years of portfolio management of which at least 10 had to be in global
asset management.  This requirement was important because the state of development
of Bolivia's capital market made it necessary to invest a large portion of the assets in
international markets in addition to efficient diversification arguments.
ii.  Minimum experience in pension fund administration and record keeping, with at least
100,000 accounts  and 5 million  transactions a year with the managed accounts.
iii. Experience  in  establishing  new  systems,  education,  information  and  enrollment,
including experience with workers that haven't been enrolled in pension plans and with
affiliating new members.
To evaluate the criteria a questionnaire with two sections had to be filled out by
each enterprise.  The first section had 8 pass/fail criteria that had to have a 100% pass rate
for the  second  section to  be  evaluated.  The second  section had 26  quantitative and
qualitative questions where the quantitative questions were worth 60% of the total.
Because  of  a  tie,  9  instead  of  8  of  the  12  asset  managers  that  presented
applications on  September  19,  1996 were  selected for  the  second  stage  (see  Table).
During this stage the selected managers had the opportunity to provide feedback on the
regulations to the law as well as on the proposed service contract.  The economic bidding
was  to  be  assessed on  one  variable "average  monthly management fee  per  account"
(AMMFA).  This fee was a weighted average of the asset management fee, fee for benefit
payment 26, and the 0.5% of the affiliate's salary. 27
26 All bidders  decided  not to charge  a fee  for  benefit  payments.
27  The 0.5% was preset  by the Govermment  in the TORs.
15Because of the importance of AMNFA, a substantial effort was expended to make
clear how this variable would be calculated.  The bidders were provided with predefined
scenarios  regarding  assets  to  be  managed,  salaries, benefit  payments,  and  insurance
premiums.  The lowest bidder would be one of the selected AFPs and the next lowest
bidder that matched the lowest bid would be the second selected bid 28.
As a result of the requirement of a guarantee from the head office in the form of a
solidary guarantee only limited by the assets under management that initially are of about
US$800 million for each AFP, only three managers submitted bids.  (It has been argued
that  American firms were  constrained by US law in offering such  a guarantee).  This
guarantee is in force as long as the structure of the business for which the bid was made is
unchanged as reflected by the Pension Law and its regulations. Although this requirement
helped  to  reduce  the  capital  requirements  for  an  AFP  and  avoid  coinvestment
requirements, it was deemed excessive by several managers.  Another issue that reduced
the interest in bidding was the standard of care.  Standard of care rules used in the US are
different from the ones in Bolivia.  The TORs required compliance with Bolivian laws.
Any claim would be first decided in a Bolivian court, and only in the last instance would
there be recourse to international arbitration.  Another, less verifiable, factor for the small
number of bids is that some of the potential bidders were very open about how aggressive
their bids would be and could have discouraged the other potential bidders.
2' In case  that no  bidder  matched  the lowest  bid,  the  fee  structure  for  the  whole  system  would  be the one
of the  second  lowest  bidder.
16Qualified Asset Managers
Franklin Templeton -Provida Internacional S.A.
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya S.A.
Goldman Sachs Asset Management International - Financial Administrative Services Corp.
Aetna--J.P. Morgan
Citibank
SBC Brinson - AON Consulting
Invesco - Argentaria
Morgan Stanley Management, Inc. - Cruz Blanca Internacional S.A.
Dresdner Bank A.G. - Allianz A.G. Holding
Ranking  of Bidders
Ranking  Name
1  Invesco - Argentaria
2  Banco Bilbao Vizcaya S.A. - Previsi6n
3  Franklin Templeton -Provida Internacional S.A.
The two selected managers agreed to charge a remarkably low AMMFA (average
monthly management fee per account) of $2.3729. This is equivalent to about .1% of the
average affiliate's salary.  The winning bidders chose not to charge a fee for the payment
of benefits and the fee for the management of assets was 0.2285% of the portfolio under
US$1 billion, 0.014% for the portion of the portfolio between US$1 and US$1.2 billion,
0.0067% for the portion of the portfolio between US$1.2 and US$1.5 billion, and nothing
for the rest of the portfolio.  The fees are fixed for three years, afterwards they become
just a ceiling and can be lowered by the AFP.  After the end of the exclusivity period the
Superintendency of Pensions can set new maximum fees.
29  The $2.37  fee is derived  from a scenario  for assets  accumulation  and assuming  an average  salary  of
$250  for each affiliate  on which  to collect  a 0.5%  account  management  fee.
17Assuming that each AFP manages the accounts of 160,000 affiliates during the
first year, each can expect income from fees of about US$4.3 million.  This income is the
result of about US$1.9 million from a fee of 0.2285% on a portfolio of US$800 million
from the  capitalization program and the  accumulation of  10% of the  average  monthly
salary of US$250  of the  160,000 affiliates. The remaining income of  US$2.4  million
comes from 0.5% of the average salary of its affiliates.  Another source of income could
come from the affiliation of new members of the pension system.
The two winning bidders have an exclusive concession for the management of the
pension system for 5 years.  No further AFP licenses will be issued until May 2002 unless
the AFPs fail to comply with their contracts.  During the exclusivity  period the AFPs will
also have to comply with service targets. Having only two participants in the market could
be considered a threat to competitive behavior.  However, the $1.6 billion to be managed
for the FCC allowed a competition for the market instead of a competition in the market
resulting in competitive fees.  Without the substantial initial resources it would have been
very difficult to  attract interested and reputable bidders.  The reputation  of the bidders
was important  because  of the  approach  of initially enforcing regulations  through  the
reputation of the manager instead of a fully developed regulatory authority until regulatory
institutions  are  strong  enough.  Once  the  system  becomes  openly  competitive  the
regulatory institutions should be fully developed.
Once the system becomes fully competitive in five years,  some features  of the
legislation could enhance this competition.  The absence of a minimum return guarantee
will open a new front for competition that  has been absent in pension reforms in other
countries.  This feature together with a portfolio regulation that gives much more room
for  the  pension manager to  set up  a  portfolio than in  other  countries will allow the
manager to  take decisions that reflect more closely its client's needs.  This could create
market opportunities for more AFPs than could be expected in a market of Bolivia's size.
18Custody  of Assets
The safety of the capitalization and pension assets will be  ensured by entrusting
them to a global custodian.  This custodian was selected through international competitive
bidding and initiated its  activities as the  trustee  of the  capitalized assets.  The  same
institution will be  the  custodian  for  the  first  five years  of  the  new  pension  system.
Afterwards the AFPs will be allowed to contract this service from any authorized entity.
The fee of 0.2% of the assets under custody is collected directly by the custodian
from the return 30 on the assets and is not paid by the AFPs 31. It is expected that with the
participation of Bolivia's stock exchange the custodian will expand its services from the
two  AFPs to  the  rest  of the  capital market.  Trough  the  custodian,  monitoring  and
registering transactions will be facilitated as well as the supervision of the AFPs by the
Superintendency of Pensions.
Transition  between  Pension  Systems
Completely closing the old pension system at the start of the new pension system
without a decades long transition is truly remarkable. It not only provides a clean cut with
the  past but  it incorporates  all workers, without  exceptions for the president, military,
police, oil workers, politicians, judiciary etc. It has the benefit of substantially reducing the
net present value of the Government liabilities 32, gives a clear signal about the commitment
and  the  permanence of  the reform,  simplifies the  process  of  reform, supervision  and
management, reduces the  compliance cost  for  enterprises, and  is  equitable among all
sectors of the working population.
30  In case  of  negative  returns  the  custodian's  contract  allows  him  to sell  assets  to collect  its fee.
31  There are ongoing  negotiations  about a lower  fee for assets  that are not traded.
32  In some scenarios  up to a third of the net present  value of the liabilities,  equivalent  to over  $1 bn.
19The decision to  close the  old system was also  taken because  the Government
wanted to  make clear that the affiliates are the owners of the resources  in the  system,
something that is essentially undefined in a "pay as you go" system.  In addition, keeping
both systems open either for a long time or permanently has several potential drawbacks:
(i) total  administrative costs may be higher, (ii) total  contribution rates may need to  be
higher to give both systems a critical mass of funds to manage, (iii) the contribution to the
"pay as you go" system continues to be perceived as a tax on labor making more difficult
enforcement of  payment of  all contributions,  (iv) the  issue  of  the  level playing field
between  the two  systems will continually resurface,  and (v)  outstanding Government
guarantees may be higher.
The  only reason  to  keep  both  systems in  place  was  to  reduce  the  financing
requirements of the transition at the expense of higher public sector liabilities. Closing the
old system in Bolivia at the same time that the new system started,  although certainly
worth  doing  it, requires  a  larger financing effort,  particularly in  the  short  run.  The
requirement of having to invest most of the workers contributions of the next few years in
treasury bonds to help finance the transition is questionable. This requirement could lower
the impact of the pension reform through lower returns  on worker's pension accounts 33
and could discourage affiliation.
Financing Requirements of the Pension Reform
Year  1997  1998  1999  2000  2007  2017  2027  2037
% of GDP  2.24  2.72  2.57  2.23  1.33  0.86  0.57  0.18
US$ mn.(1996)  152  192  188  170  134  141  146  72
33  Efforts are ongoing to develop an efficient market for treasury bonds, so that their return would
approach  market  rates.
20Closing the old system also involved critical decisions about the 38 complementary
pension funds. Although these funds were nominally  private, every time such a fund had a
financial crisis, the Government was forced to  absorb the payments because these funds
had become defacto  mandatory for the workers in the entities covered by these funds.  In
addition, there was a large mismatch between the contributions and the promised benefits,
both  in terms of age requirements and replacement rates, that  made it very  likely that
sooner rather than later almost all these funds would need a Government bail out.  The
variance in the rules between funds and the limited transferability of rights between them,
particularly between the public and private sectors, would have required profound reforms
of the complementary funds system. A case by case reform of complementary funds was
not politically  viable. Under these circumstances there existed a large risk of moral hazard
in the management of the complementary  funds that promised to  substantially  increase the
liabilities of the Government and to reduce the remaining assets of the funds.  Including
the complernentary funds in the overall reform of the pension system appeared to be the
most  efficient solution, in spite of a cost  in net present value terms of about US$950
rnillion and growth of about 80% in the Government's financing requirements.
E.  FUTURE CHALLENGES
The pension reform process is not complete yet.  There are complementary and
necessary reforms in the capital markets and in the insurance industry that  need to  be
undertaken to put the whole system on good footing.  For example, Bolivia doesn't  have
regulations about what constitutes conflicts of interest in the capital markets.  Addressing
the insurance sector is an important issue.  At the beginning of the new pension system
insurance payments will be  paid into collective accounts.  Once  at  least  6  insurance
companies registered in Bolivia comply with predefined requirements, the AFPs will insure
the risks with one of the qualified insurance companies through an open bidding process.
To reach this stage as soon as possible, that will most likely result in lower premiums for
all  workers,  the  Government  needs  to  pass  an  improved  insurance  law,  revise  the
regulations and strengthen the Superintendency  of Insurance.
21In addition the implementation of the new pension system and closing of the old
one are not complete.  Many of the initial actions that needed to be taken and where the
rules  were  unclear  or  absent have  left  a  presence  of  the  Government  in  the  daily
management of the system that is still too large.  The discussion about alternative uses for
the capitalized assets is detrimental for the pension system as a whole, reduces the value of
the assets itself, and needs to be brought to closure to secure the reform.
The transition  needs to be completed.  Among other things, action should cover
the following areas:
i.  Complete the resolution of outstanding issues with the closed pension institutions.
ii.  Gather the information to recognize past contributions and calculate the compensation
for each contributor to the old system,.
iii. Fine tune  the regulations and their application.
iv. Establish the mechanisms by which the Treasury will transfer the  resources  to  the
AFPs or any other private agent for them to pay the pensions of the retirees of the old
system.
v.  Strengthen  the  financial  sector  regulatory  institutions,  in  particular  the
Superintendency of Pensions  and  ensure  their  independence, among  other  things
through adequate working resources.
vi.  Develop  the  statistical  information  that  will  allow  a  better  assessment  of  life
expectancy and morbidity, and loss probability so that premiums reflect the real risk
situation.
vii. Create  a  competitive  annuities  market  for  the  pension  system  by  calling  for
international bids and furthering the development of the local insurance industry.
viii.Adjust  the  compensation for  past  contributions  to  reflect  the  actual  number  of
contributions to complementary funds instead of using the number of contributions to
FOPEBA and a factor of 0.7;  and
22ix.  Introduce clear rules, well in advance of the end of the exclusivity  period in May 2002,
about how the opening of the pension market will be accomplished.
The Government should strive to remove at the earliest possible date the probably
unnecessary exceptional requirement of investing up to $180 mn. a year in treasury bonds.
This minimum  investment requirement is not only an implicit tax on the retirement savings
of all affiliated workers but it also creates  a bad precedent for mandatory uses of the
portfolio.  If the removal of this requirement is not achievable in the near term because of
financial concerns, the Government should make strong efforts to  develop an  efficient
bond market  in which it could trade its  bonds and document a  substantial part  of its
liabilities.  This requirement is a  completely different situation of those  that  existed in
other  countries  where  investment  ceilings were  temporarily  removed  to  reflect  the
instruments available in  the  country and  the  state  of  development  of  the  regulatory
capacity and of local capital markets.
The development of efficient bond and  stock  markets will require  an  adequate
securities law and regulatory framework.  For example the AFPs are facing substantial
constraints to trade the capitalized shares they are being paid to manage.  Under current
rules these shares cannot be readily transformed into a diversified portfolio or considered
liquid assets.  If the rules of the securities market are not improved in the short term, the
pension reform could be undermined.
23F.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Bolivian pension reform represents a bold  program that  has gone  in  some
respects beyond the Chilean prototype:
*  It  has  involved  an  immediate closing down  of  the  old  PAYGO  system  and  its
replacement by  a  defined contribution  system, based  on  individual capitalization
accounts and managed by the private sector.
*  The pensions of the old system will be covered by the Bolivian Treasury.
*  Workers will receive compensatory pensions for their contributions to the old system.
These are calculated on the basis of a simple and, probably, generous formula, that will
increase the cost of transition.
*  To avoid the very high marketing costs of pension reforms of other Latin American
countries, the Bolivian reform has entrusted the management of the system and the
individual accounts  to  2  groups  that  have  been  selected  after  an  international
competitive bidding process that has had as its aim to minimize fees.
*  Individual accounts have been pre-allocated to these two groups on a regional basis
or, for the large cities where both have been authorized to operate, on the basis of the
birthday of affiliated workers.
*  Competition for individual  accounts will be allowed in the year 2000, while the market
will be opened to other AFPs in 2002.
*  The  reform  program  has  also  involved  the  utilization  of  the  proceeds  of  the
"capitalization" program for the payment of a universal annuity to all Bolivians of over
65 years of age.
*  The funds of the capitalization program will also be managed by the two  selected
AFPs, while custodianship has been entrusted to a multinational group offering global
custodial services.
24AFP investments  are only subject  to upper limits,  including  relatively  high limits for
foreign  assets. However,  AFPs are initially  compelled  to purchase a certain quantity
of treasury  bonds  to help  finance  the cost of transition.
The major challenges  facing  the Bolivian  reform  are:
*  To create a competitive  market for management  of pension  fund resources  and hence
achieve  competitive  investment  returns  and higher  pensions.
*  To eliminate  the requirement  for a minimum  investment  in treasury  bonds.
*  To insulate  the new system  from future attempts  to use the funds of the AFPs and of
the capitalization  proceeds  for public  projects.
*  One way to achieve  this insulation  would be to transfer ownership  of capitalization
proceeds  to individual  Bolivians.
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